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21 August 1981

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 40/81)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ENERGY PROGRAM TO STRESS CONSERVATION

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Jul 81 pp 170-172

/Text/ Next fall the Bonn Government intends to present its new energy program: Conservation has absolute priority.

In the long run this strategy is bound to be costly for consumers, whether domestic or commercial.

While Germans refresh themselves during the summer in the mountains and on the beaches, officials in the offices of the Bonn economic departments sweat over a difficult piece of homework: The "third forward projection of the energy program."

When designing this "afterburner," the officials must take into account the different and often controversial demands of the economy and the parties. Industry wants cheap power for its machines and, with the support of the CDU/CSU fraction, calls for the prompt construction of nuclear reactors. The government parties fear citizens protests and therefore proclaim "social acceptance and social compatibility." They all are at one only in their demand for "getting away from oil."

As the Bonn Governments prefers not to be at odds with anyone, ministry officials seek the tried and trusted way out of the dilemma: They write something for everyone into the program--with a special accent "in accordance with the political priority for energy conservation," as per department director Dr Ulrich Engelmann, head of the energy department at the Federal Ministry for Economics.

The strategy adopted is liable to be costly for household and industrial consumers as well as for the government: Lower consumption takes priority over economic efficiency. "Conservation is the greatest and most important source of energy" says Erwin Stahl, parliamentary state secretary at the Federal Research Ministry. That could well be true; however--Stahl is prudently silent regarding the cost.

Federal and Laender finance ministers will note how expensive it is to tap these sources once long-distance heat becomes the core of the conservation strategy (as per plan). Bonn intends long-distance heat to displace oil as the No 1 heat supplier for residential buildings in order to relieve pressure on the foreign exchange reserves by better utilizing the energy produced by the electricity plants. The technical jargon for such utilization is "power-heat coupling." While traditional power plants use 1 kg of coal to generate 390 grams of electricity and the lion's share of

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energy goes to heat the air and rivers in the form of waste, specialized thermal power plants convert 600-700 grams into useful energy: They supply electricity and heat at one and the same time, the heat flowing in the form of hot water to the consumer by way of its own pipeline system.

#### The Consequences of Bonn's Energy Program

Still, experts such as Dr Heinz Juergen Schuermann, Energy Institute at Cologne University, warn "of undue euphoria." Economic realities prevent the hoped for victorious advance. Long-distance heat requires large investments which cannot be quickly amortized. Normally it is not possible simply to convert existing power plants (Prof Helmut Schaefer, Munich Technical University).

Particularly costly are the specially insulated pipes. According to a study by the Steag of Essen, DM8 billion for pipes would need to be invested in order to heat half the 2.2 million residences between Duisburg and Dortmund by long-distance heating. An additional DM4 billion would have to spent on thermal power plants. As the municipal electricity works are unable to afford such amounts, the Federal Government and the Laender will have no choice but to step in with subsidies.

Moreover, energy suppliers shy away from investments because they are not certain whether and when residential buildings will be linked to the network. Building owners generally convert only when the existing heating equipment stops working. Hansgeorg Winter, director of the Cologne city supply plant, reports that this results in serious losses in the initial stages.

Moreover, in view of the large amount of capital needed for the distribution network, long-distance heat becomes profitable soonest in conurbations. There, however, many building owners have only recently converted to gas heating, and energy suppliers invested a lot of money in gas pipelines. If long-distance heat were to edge out natural gas thanks to government subsidies, these facilities could not be amortized. The Essen municipal plant, for example, would have to write off DM22 million in the Ruettenscheid district alone.

It is also disputed whether the promotion of long-distance heating will really pay off for the national economy. According to the Steag study the expansion of the long-distance heating network in the Ruhr district would conserve 8 liters of fuel oil per annum per DM100 investment. The insulation of the basement in a one-family home yields a conservation effect of 32 liters, a thermal waste gas valve 291 liters and new fuel jets 1,165 liters. (These figures are cited by Federal Construction Minister Dieter Haack in a letter to home owners.)

In future federal citizens will not receive subsidies for such investments, although they do get them as per the energy conservation program now in force. Lambsdorff's senior energy official Engelmann says "we have provided enough incentives in this area." According to the planned new program Bonn will make available funds only "if the measure can be shown to be uneconomic," for example heat pumps or solar collectors.

Otherwise the Federal Government is gambling that higher prices will be enough to create greater energy consciousness. When oil and gas get more expensive on the world market, consumers will have to pay more for heat or handle energy more rationally.

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In contrast to the proposals made by the nuclear energy commission of inquiry and former Research Minister Volcker Hauff, Bonn will forego government ordered conservation. Those who insist on turning up the heat while keeping windows open will not have to expect a fine.

It is up to every federal citizen whether he wants to build an oil-heated swimming pool or drive at 200 km speeds on the motorway. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt disarms citizens anxieties by saying "we are no energy tyrants and do not intend to spoil anyone's enjoyment of their electric toothpick."

Indirectly however: Demand keeps rising despite diligent conservation efforts, and energy producers will be allowed to meet it to only a limited extent by nuclear energy--although, according to the latest computations of Cologne Prof Hans Karl Schneider, nuclear energy will be 4 pfennig cheaper than electricity generated in power plants fueled by subsidized German coal. The consequence: German industry already pays 25 percent more for electricity than its French competitors. Nothing much is likely to change with regard to these cost disadvantages, even should Bonn approve the 6-10 new nuclear power projects currently in preparation by the Laender governments.

Cologne scientist Schuermann fears that "energy policy is geared too unilaterally to conservation." Bonn therefore neglects "to look beyond the immediate future." According to Schuermann Bonn's energy program should enable domestic producers--by financial aid, for example--to ensure an appropriate share in world energy reserves for the FRG as a major economic power.

A run on the assumed deposits of coal, gas and oil has already begun. If nothing happens, the Germans will once again arrive too late. The future of energy supplies for the German economy would then remain uncertain even after the end of the oil age.

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TRADE DIFFICULTIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA VIEWED

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Jul 81 pp 12-13

/Text/ The Saudis are paying, the Saudis are not paying; they are paying, they are not paying--German-Arab relations are more insecure than they have been for a long time. Is the oil and credit supplier of the Germans turning into a mirage?

The demonstration of sympathy had two main actors: Crown Prince Fahd, strong man of Saudi Arabia, praised "on this happy day" the "good friend" from Germany and promised help in the struggle against the economic and financial recession: "As part of the free world we are glad to participate in the efforts at stabilization." Helmut Schmidt, the weakened chancellor of the FRG, thanked him and, in particular, lauded German-Saudi cooperation as "loyal and solid."

It is therefore all the more noteworthy how easily the solidity of relations was called in question at the next occasion. Only a month after the exchange of compliments between the chiefs of government in Riyadh some small talk at a Bonn reception aroused alarm. The WELT AM SONNTAG ran the headline "Saudis Block Loans," and even the SPIEGEL, confidant of the government, noted "Riyadh Dampers for the Germans." And yet all that had happened was that departing Saudi Ambassador to Bonn Muhammad Nouri Ibrahim told Guenther van Well, former state secretary at the Foreign Ministry and currently German ambassador to the United Nations, that "friendship is a two-way street"--as a reminder of the Riyadh Government's wish to acquire the German Leopard II tank.

The anxiety of the debtor Federal Government is understandable. This year it may have to spend possibly DM10 billion more than initially planned and, moreover, have to admit that the deficit in the 1981 German current account will not decline (as was expected earlier) but achieve at least last year's amount of DM28 billion.

The Saudis could offer relief for both woes. After all, they are currently earning at least \$300 daily from the sale of their oil--more than \$100 billion annually (in terms of D-marks: 250 billion). Up to now the Saudi bank of issue Sama granted a credit line of DM11 billion to Federal Finance Minister Hans Matthoefer. DM8 billion have already gone to Bonn. The money is paid directly in U.S. dollars--that is not transferred by way of the Euro dollar market--and helps bridge the gaps in Germany's foreign exchange balance and the federal budget. Whether this dollar aid from Riyadh may be further increased does not depend only upon the Saudis (to employ the phrase

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they like to use) "ability to perceive the traditional German-Arab friendship," in other words obtain weapons made in Germany.

At the same time the Germans should examine how far they are willing to become dependent upon the Saudis. The most significant data of German-Saudi economic cooperation so far involve

-- Oil supplies: For 2 years the share of Saudi deliveries in FRG oil imports--cheap within the OPEC context--has been rising. Currently it amounts to 27 percent, soon it will be 30-35 percent.

-- Exports: After the United States Saudi Arabia is the second largest export market for the Germans outside Europe. Last year we earned DM4.5 billion for goods and services, almost half of Saudi oil supplies to the FRG. Some 65,000 German jobs depend on Arab business. Major construction firms such as Hochtief AG of Essen derive a third of their turnover from Saudi Arabia.

-- Deficiency guarantees: The FRG's guarantees for loss of payments for German exports to Saudi Arabia amount to DM24 billion and are therefore much higher than for any other customer country.

-- Finances: According to estimates by the Near and Middle East Union in Hamburg Saudi financiers keep DM20-25 billion in German bank accounts and securities--and if such large funds were to be abruptly withdrawn, foreign exchange traders might suffer coronaries, and the D-mark would be exposed to almost uncontrollable drops in the exchange rate.

Government spokesman Kurt Becker, though, is convinced that the Mideast risk is quite acceptable for the FRG: "We live within a totality of dependencies. We must simply diversify to the extent that one loss will not result in collapse. In the individual case that depends on political stability, and you will see therefore how highly we esteem Saudi Arabian stability."

In the meantime Federal Chancellor Schmidt has begun his advance. On the occasion of his visit to Riyadh in late April last he called for far more extensive cooperation between the two countries. After all, Saudi Arabia, the capital of which resembles a giant construction site and the roads of which are lined by more wrecked cars than can be seen anywhere else, intends from 1981-1985 to spend almost DM500 billion on modernization. No less than DM175 billion are earmarked for new industries, DM75 billion for housing and hospitals, DM40 billion for electricity supply and DM20 billion for telephone networks. The estimates of the German economy's potential annual share in Saudi Arabian orders range from DM6 billion (Hochtief executive board member Harald Peipers) to DM20 billion (Near and Middle East Union).

The Germans also consider desirable the combination of German technology and Saudi money with regard to aid for the Islamic developing countries Turkey, Sudan and Pakistan. Schmidt also invited the Saudis to acquire stock in FRG companies and had two of his traveling companions explore the potential for contacts between scientists: Prof Eugen Seibold, president of the German Research Association, and Prof Reimar Luest, president of the Max Planck Society.

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Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Faysal did accept the German proposals with the comment: "We welcome extensive cooperation without any reservation." Decoded this means: Even without reservation in matters weapons. On the other hand the Saudis are reluctant to forego the Leopard II tank for reasons of security and prestige. The Saudis appreciate that Chancellor Schmidt personally would not object to weapons deliveries but that he is compelled--in the face of strong resistance by his own party--to first amend the hitherto applicable and narrow principles governing German weapons exports. However, nobody knows how much time they are willing to allow him.

Chancellery chief Manfred Lahnstein considers a "basic declaration on the redefinition of export terms" possible by the fall. Prof Karl Kaiser, director of the Research Institute at the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn, on the other hand, thinks it may take a year. "Nevertheless," he says, "appreciable progress must be achieved by the fall. The Chancellor must tackle the internal debate."

The fall date has its reasons. The next conference of the German-Saudi economic commission is scheduled for the second week of November in Bonn. Whether accidentally or otherwise--the first reading of the 1982 federal budget is scheduled in the Bundestag for just that time. One topic of the debate: The finance minister's need for loans.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

WEST BERLIN YOUTH STREET VIOLENCE PERSISTS

Hamburg STERN in German 2 Jul 81 p 110

[Article by Wolfgang Metzner: "They Are After a Dead Body"]

[Text] The confrontations between squatters, disruptive elements and the police in Berlin are becoming increasingly vicious. Even the new CDU Senat is at a loss for a solution.

"One, two, three--set the people free!" With this battlecry for their arrested political comrades, masked demonstrators advanced on the Schoeneberg city hall. Stone throwers rushed forward in rows like spear throwers in ancient wars. Policemen fled behind water cannon. Tear gas grenades were hurled back at them. Burghard Seidel, who was standing between the lines with a transmitter truck from Radio Free Berlin, said: "Sometimes the sky was dark with stones." Laughing punks opened the truck door and asked: "Well, are we on the air?"

Behind the lines there was looting and celebrating: At Bolle's pastry shop in Schoeneberg, the store windows were first smashed, then torte shells and bags of candy from the store shelves were flung onto the street, champagne corks popped, an incendiary charge set the supermarket on fire, which was advertising with a large banner: "Everything for a great barbecue." Two corners away, citizens watched from their balconies, beer glass in hand, as brightly painted figures smashed the windows at Kaiser's and dragged away cardboard boxes with food.

The bottom line of the worst street battle of this year in Berlin: 76 policemen reported injured, dozens of damaged private cars, which were pushed across streets as barricades, a devastated savings bank and looting even in a pharmacy. The damage resulting from broken windows--from the Land criminal justice building and the CONSTANZE editorial building to the NEUE HEIMAT--runs into the millions. "It has undoubtedly taken on a new quality", was the concerned comment of police spokesman Eberhard Schulz: Stones thrown at the windows of private houses, incendiary attacks against policemen--we haven't had that before". His boss, Berlin's new senator for internal affairs, Heinrich Lummer (CDU): "Brutal beyond all bounds."

Lummer, who was unable to control the "gutter rampage" (BERLINER MORGENPOST) with 1,470 policemen on duty, was quick to assign the blame: The Alternative List had "conjured demons that no one wanted to exorcise". It was of no concern to Lummer

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that the Alternatives on the spot attempted to halt the excesses ("Stop that crap!"). The senator is apparently unaware that the "council" of the 150 houses in Berlin occupied by squatters is at odds with the Alternative List and is absolutely unwilling to be guided by it.

"The Senat should pay for every eviction. The riot had been in the making for a long time", was an opinion to be heard after the battle among members of the counterculture. The state attorney's office had worn down the squatters with house searches. But it was the new CDU Senat which had had a "symbol" of the movement: the house at 45 Mittenwalder Strasse in Kreuzberg. It had been occupied since February 1981.

A writeoff company plans to "modernize it in luxury style" with DM 1.35 million in public subsidies. The high rent--DM 21 per square meter--is to be "subsidized down" to DM 4.75 with tax money. Even the new senator for construction, Ulrich Rastenborski, thinks this idea is wrong. But, he says, the promises of his SPD predecessors are binding, and the project cannot be halted.

As leader of the parliamentary opposition, Hans-Jochen Vogel was complaining that the new Senat had "needlessly" expanded the confrontation. "He shouldn't shoot off his mouth now and go over to the side of the squatters", says Thomas, who lives in a squatter occupied house. The young squatters have not forgotten that impressive police parades took place under Vogel, and that the Berlin SPD created the housing shortage as a consequence of years of theoretical misplanning.

CDU member Lummer now wants to try "dialogue" after the battle. But the new Apo (extraparliamentary opposition) in Berlin, which considers the Alternative List in the House of Delegates only as its "playing foot", while it keeps its "weight-bearing foot" on the streets, sees even the nomination of the law-and-order man as a "declaration of war".

Major concern has long since moved on from the scandal that 10,000 apartments along the River Spree are standing empty, in spite of a housing shortage. It is no longer just a hard core of 3,000 squatters that believes rocks are apparently arguments, because violence is taken seriously. Frustrated 16-year olds in leather jackets shout: "Germany, Germany, everything is finished", and smash windows in banks and supermarkets and ransack them. Spray-painted on the wall of a new building: "Pity concrete doesn't burn."

Last Thursday police heard the word go out: "Burn the Kudamm!" The Berlin boulevard could have been destroyed at leisure on the Sunday before Easter, because the police chiefs were meeting in useless discussions about what to do, instead of giving the order to advance to their units in the side streets.

This time the Kurfuerstendamm was adequately protected. But the young militants developed new tactics: They appear suddenly in small squads in different parts of the city, vandalize shops and disappear again. So far, Lummer has no plan to counter this. Policemen, who have been on duty for 50 hours, are developing their own tactics: "No arrests, club them." In the last demonstration, a policeman struck a woman on the head so hard with his truncheon that the weapon broke.

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Considering the severity of the last street battle, it is almost a miracle that there were no deaths. "Yes, they are after a dead body, a new Ohnesorg", is the opinion of police chief Guenther Freund concerning the militant demonstrators.

In the meantime it is no longer certain that policemen are not stirring up the flames. A journalist and several demonstrators claim to have seen policemen who put on AL buttons and jumped out of police cars as masked "rioters". Senator Lummer has so far rejected this assertion as "ridiculous".

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF REVIVAL HOPES: LOCAL, PROPORTIONAL ELECTIONS

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Jul-2 Aug 81 pp 16-18

[Article by Michel Chamard]

[Text] Debate between "Stalinists" and "Eurocommunists" within the PCF [French Communist Party]. Mr Marchais looks for a way out.

Mr Georges Marchais is caught in a crossfire. The two extremes of the PCF are joining together in the same accusation: the secretary general is destroying the party. For the "Eurocommunists," labelled "opportunists" by the leadership, the rupture of the union of the left led to the present debacle. The prosoviet hard core, on the other hand, blames it on the lack of ideological steadfastness. All observers see the PCF secretary general as a leader living on borrowed time.

Several months away from the 24th congress scheduled for early 1982, Mr Marchais has achieved little of which to boast. In the last 3 years, the PCF has lost one-fourth of its voters and half its deputies. The militants are distressed, as shown by the smaller number of campaign posters put up during the presidential and legislative campaigns. The communist press is showing a disturbing deficit. Mr Marchais' personal authority comes out weakened. Mr Philippe Robrieux explains why in the interview he gave to VALEURS ACTUELLES.

A 45-year-old professor tenured in history, and a research director at CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], Mr Robrieux is an expert: a former communist student leader, a protege of Maurice Thorez, he belonged to the PCF until 1968, after having had a seat on the central committee. He has just published the second volume of his "Internal History of the Communist Party," (Fayard), which covers the period 1945-1972: an indispensable reference work in a lively style. To the exegesis of archives Mr Robrieux has added personal reminiscences or those of militants with whom he has remained in contact:

"The only way to understand a closed system, with its rites and its unwritten laws," he says.

Mr Marchais performed his self-criticism before the central committee on 26 June, but diluted his own responsibility with that of his predecessors. After all, he explained, he was only the managing heir trying to carry out a policy to which the party had too far committed itself before his arrival for any possibility of reconsideration.

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"The common program nourished illusions about the PSF by leading people to believe that it had completely changed, to the point of eliminating the difference between our two parties. That contributed to fostering among our voters the idea of a meaningful vote for a noncommunist candidate."

To whom was he alluding? Mr Waldeck Rochet, who launched the process of the union of the left, agreed to Francois Mitterrand's lone [within the left] candidacy in 1965, then the withdrawal of several communist candidates who were frontrunners on the left in 1967.

Even Maurice Thorez, who supported Mr Marchais' rise, is suspect. Analyzing the period which followed the Khrushchev statement of 1956, Mr Marchais says:

"When one examines that period, one realizes that we were only able to deal with these problems after a considerable delay. The party continued to come up with old answers that were no longer well adapted to the needs of the struggle. Mr Marchais announced that a 'serious, wide, and profound' debate would be opened this fall to define the political line to be submitted to the congress."

Meanwhile he added, "The debate within the party cannot be subject to outside pressures."

Four days later, the federal committee of Paris excluded Mr Henri Fiszbin and 10 of his supporters. The committee of Hauts-de-Seine did the same with respect to the young mayor of Sevres, Mr Roger Fajnzyberg, for organizing a faction within the party.

Last May, several communist officials, among them Fiszbin and Fajnzyberg, set up a study group, "Rencontres Communistes," endowed with a weekly bulletin which very quickly had 3,000 subscribers.

Mr Fiszbin, 51, his expressive, bespectacled face, is the ringleader of these "opportunists" that were denounced by the PCF leadership organizer, this the son of a Polish Jewish hatter established at Belleville, joined the party at the age of 15, becoming a permanent member 12 years later. Self-taught, devoted to classical music, he carried the federation of Paris which he headed into support of the union of the left. Opposed to the break with the PSF, he was relieved of his federal responsibilities in 1978. His friend and mentor, Mr Paul Laurent, has not had a word to say in his defense, and he was replaced by his own cousin, Mr Henri Malberg.

"Will one go so far as to class any critical opinions as outside pressure?" asks Henri Fiszbin, who denounces the hardening of the leadership and challenges the analysis in the Marchais report. He notes that the union of the left made it possible for the PCF to win a number of mayoralties in 1977.

Mr Fiszbin remains isolated, but his sentiments are in fact widely shared.

Mr Marchais has had to take into account the aspirations for unity of a part of his base, by accepting the entry of communists into the government and ministerial solidarity, which obliges him to forego any opposition to the socialists.

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No one is fooled: it is a question of buying time. Until when?

Probably until the municipal elections of 1983. For the PCF, maintaining their position at the heart of a large number of municipalities is vital: it means parallel circuits of financing and personnel recruitment. Now this battle for the municipalities can only be fought in tandem with the PSF.

The communists could then regain their freedom of action to try to recover their former voters from the socialists, by taking an opposition stance. Mr Robrieux appears skeptical as do the leaders of Rencontres Communistes. One of them told me:

"The PCF has fought Mitterrand too much. It will have a hard time being believed if it denounces the socialist errors again even if they are real ones."

Another hope for the PCF: the establishment of proportionality, which would free it from its tactical alliance with the PSF. As long ago as 22 June, Rene Andrieu mentioned on television this formal promise of Mr Mitterrand.

The policy of participation in the government has reawakened another faction opposing Marchais, but one which up to now has remained in the background: the "Stalinists."

Some officials [within the party] did not accept with good grace the injunction to support Mitterrand after 26 April. One journalist who resigned from L'HUMANITE, Alain Leygnier, accuses several staff members of the daily of having given instructions to abstain or vote for Giscard d'Estaing on 10 May. Among them is mentioned the head of the cultural service, who is today a member of Charles Fiterman's cabinet staff.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR of 11 July described a meeting in the Paris suburbs of some 40 PCF staff members, including two federal secretaries, who support a withdrawal of the communist ministers and rapprochement with Moscow.

Judging the Marchais report too weak in its criticism of the union of the left, they have reportedly decided to organize for the 24th congress. Among the means being considered are a bulletin, and a "free" radio station at Argenteuil.

In its July edition, the bulletin "Le Communiste des Bouches-du-Rhone" bitterly condemns "participation in a bourgeois government": "The communist party had its justification in the struggle of the classes that were pushed to the limit."

The "Russian lobby" remains very influential, if not at the base, at least within the party leadership. No one is unaware of the hostility shown by Georges Gosnat, the party treasurer, or Maxime Gremetz towards the entry of communists into the government, as no one is unaware of the hostility of Gaston Plissonnier, head of the apparatus and "eye of Moscow" on Place du Colonel Fabien. They have a standard-bearer among the old militants: Mrs Jeannette Vermeersch, Thorez' widow.



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The party's press office found it necessary to deny the existence of a pro-Soviet faction hostile to the current line and resolved to restrain the leadership. Thus the information was perceived to be an embarrassment.

Mr Marchais still has things in his favor: the network of the faithful that have been put in place in key sectors of the apparatus, and also the prestige of his position. Mr Robrieux nevertheless stresses their limited value.

One man is patiently awaiting his hour: Roland Leroy, the editor of L'HUMANITE. This 55-year-old former resistance partisan, touted as a "liberal," then as a "hardliner," was removed from the secretariat by Marchais in 1979. He announced that he would personally deliver the major speech on L'HUMANITE's anniversary on 13 September. That speech is often reserved for the secretary general.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

ROBRIEUX: MARCHAIS VERSUS TWO PCF WINGS; FUTURE PRECARIOUS

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Jul-2 Aug 81 p 17

[Interview with Philippe Robrieux, a researcher in history at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), author of "Internal History of the Communist Party," and former member of the PCF]

[Text] [Question] What is your explanation of the failure of Georges Marchais' strategy over the last 3 years?

[Answer] He has no political strategy: first he idles, then he races. Brezhnev convinced him that capitalism was in its death agony. Thus he put the emphasis on the revolutionary character of the PCF, which led to the rupture of the union of the left.

Up until last year, it was not unrealistic to bet on the triumph of the Soviet Union: compare the map of the world in 1970 with that of 1980, and you see the advance of the Soviet camp during the Carter-Giscard era. One can understand how Georges Marchais let himself be carried away: this explains his finger pointed like a missile on television during his trip to Moscow after the invasion of Afghanistan.

What remains of these hopes since the advent of Ronald Reagan and the departure of Valery Giscard d'Estaing? One might think that Soviet expansionism is going to march in place, that oil blackmail will become problematic, at least for the next 4 years.

Francois Mitterrand will be a less malleable interlocutor than Valery Giscard d'Estaing: it seems most improbable to me that Jean-Baptiste Doumeng is henceforth going to keep his access to the Elysee. So Georges Marchais remains at the moment hanging in air.

[Question] Is it not true that the PCF is counting on exploiting, at some point in time, the dissatisfaction with the new regime?

[Answer] If Georges Marchais bets on the economic crisis, on the end of the PS's honeymoon, that is an analysis by a nursery-school Marxist. Even granting the hypothesis, how can the reactions of the French be prejudged? Will they not make sacrifices for Francois Mitterrand that they would have refused Valery Giscard d'Estaing?

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Georges Marchais has mentioned the strikes that marked the arrival of the left in power in 1936. The situation is different: in 1936, the idea of the workers was to force to its knees an employer class that was more autocratic than the one of today. Today, fear of crisis has made them aware that they cannot have things exactly as they want them, that they must help Francois Mitterrand.

[Question] What then is Mr Marchais' future?

[Answer] Ultimately, he seems to be losing. The hard core of the party, the faction that followed the secret instructions to vote for Valery Giscard d'Estaing on 10 May, has not really accepted the fact of seeing the secretary general implicitly betray it by expressing his pleasure at the victory of the socialist candidate. A part of this hard core is aligned with the "Eurocommunists" again in accusing Georges Marchais of destroying the party.

The PCF finds itself in the position of a heart patient: the circumstances are favorable for a violent seizure, but no one knows when it will come. Certainly, Georges Marchais has put his men in key positions. But Khrushchev had also done this, and was no less easily overthrown.

The naming of communist ministers gave Georges Marchais a big boost, and put off an immediate coup. If the leadership of the PCF had refused to participate in the government, the apparatus would have concluded that he had chosen confrontation with the socialists, which would have been a disaster at the municipal elections. Then, Georges Marchais would have been swept away, despite the almost preternatural respect which makes of the secretary general an infallible figure.

Georges Marchais has himself struck the first blows at that myth: he has made it into a caricature which does not correspond to the aspirations for dignity and social ascension of the communist electorate. The man and his style are both condemned. As it is one hopes he can still speak in the first person singular.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

THIRD WORLD COOPERATION POLICY OUTLINED BY COT

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 17 Jul 81 p 43

[Interview with Minister of Cooperation and Development Jean-Pierre Cot by Liliane Gallifet; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] You recently said: "We have inherited 23 years of detestable practices." To which ones were you referring?

[Answer] This ministry has emerged from what was the Ministry of Cooperation -- that is, a postcolonial and neocolonial situation at one and the same time. The custom was basically to establish personal contacts between chiefs of state in order to put together, piece by piece, a cooperation policy that did not fit into the framework of a development strategy.

[Question] What is the philosophy of the new cooperation?

[Answer] Responding to the expectations of the African nations themselves. In Lagos last year, they defined their own strategy, a self-centered development more in tune with their domestic needs. Our role is to support that effort. This is an important step compared with France's previous attitude. Another vital point for me is the role of the nongovernmental organizations. These associations can do things that governments cannot do. I would like to translate this into budget terms by giving strong financial support to their action. I hope to rebalance the funds I have in their favor by reducing certain actions of my ministry that are too heavy-handed and poorly adapted to cooperation.

[Question] The socialists have often denounced "the unhealthy relations" which France had with Gabon, the Central African Republic or Zaire. What modifications do you expect to make?

[Answer] We expect to establish relations between nations -- that is, depersonalize them. There will be no more cohorts or rascals. France's role is to help its partners take over their business themselves. For example, in the Central African Republic, following Bokassa's fall, French officials exercised high-level responsibilities in the Central African administration, which is an unhealthy situation, not to mention the fact that it is in fact a recolonization. It is indispensable that in the months to come -- for this cannot be done suddenly -- we reach a re-Africanization of all administrative and political personnel in that country, withdrawing our own.

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[Question] But how? Is the regime in the Central African Republic not propped up by the technical assistants?

[Answer] The regime in the Central African Republic is not propped up. On the contrary, it is made more fragile by the excessive responsibility assumed by the French in the administrative and political structures of government.

[Question] Do you not believe that announcing the withdrawal of the French officials risks being perceived as abandonment?

[Answer] Not at all. I have spoken of this with the prime minister of the Central African Republic. He agrees with me. He himself perceives the presence of these French officials as a form of neocolonialism that is poorly tolerated.

[Question] Will you do the same thing elsewhere, in the Ivory Coast, for example, where the French also play an important role?

[Answer] We hope that cooperation will be what it should never have ceased being: technical aid. The vocation of cooperation is for our engineers to provide the apprenticeship for the African technicians. On the other hand, we should not be directly involved in administration. We must not subsidize budgets endlessly, which we are forced to do in catastrophic situations. This is actually an admission of failure. We must put an end to these mistakes. This cannot be done overnight, but we must reinvent a policy that will permit the African countries to gradually stand on their own two feet.

[Question] Do you intend to change the status of the technical assistants, who have to date been paid by the Africans?

[Answer] It is normal for the Africans to pay the technical assistants. A service rendered must be paid for. Having said that much, we shall take measures to reconcile the disparities between the situation of technical assistants from Quai d'Orsay and those from the Ministry of Cooperation.

[Question] The technical assistants have often been criticized for favoring the French enterprises that invest in Africa. Are you among those who find this wrong?

[Answer] Not at all. I think it is very important to link the Third World cooperation and aid effort with France's economic interest. If we cannot demonstrate that it is very important for our economy to embark upon a policy of cooperation and development, we shall not have the support of French opinion, especially in the current crisis. The Third World is perceived as a competitor, an often disloyal one, an economic burden, even an obstacle in times of crisis. Now then, I am convinced that it is through a policy of cooperation, through the intensification of our trade with the Third World that we can create jobs in France. A well-understood generosity can go hand in hand with our country's interest.

[Question] Africa's medical development has been left to the United States. Do you deplore this fact?

[Answer] We have not abandoned our medical action. If this were the interpretation of the agreement made, we would do away with it. Actually, a certain type of

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coordination is needed between the different health policies in the African countries and in concertation with them. I have met with African health officials. They have told me of their astonishment at not being consulted. There can be no question of leaving everything up to the Americans in the field, first of all, because we believe that as far as Africa is concerned, our health policy is the best one -- our doctors are better acquainted with African problems -- and next, because that it not what the Africans want and it is up to them to decide.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

BANGUI CRISIS TESTS PS IDEALS, NONINTERFERENCE

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 31 Jul-6 Aug 81 p 49

[Article by Jacques Esperandieu]

[Text] Central African Republic again! The threats of a crisis in Bangui put the Elysee in an awkward situation.

The French Government is rather embarrassed. The state of siege decreed in the Central African Republic by President David Dacko plunges it into a dilemma: to continue to support a regime which is now openly violating democratic norms, or to contribute to its fall at the risk of seeing itself accused of interference.

Bangui, 14 July: three dead (including a French technician) and about 30 wounded, in a bomb attack which destroyed Le Club, a downtown cinema. "The kick-off of a series of actions which will only end with the departure of the last French soldier," claims the Central African National Liberation Movement (MCLN), which claims credit for the attack. The MCLN? A minuscule group founded last December in Lagos (Nigeria), by Idi Lalla, who was once a sociology student at Nanterre. In a word, hardly substantial enough to make the authorities tremble, one would think.

Wrong. Their reaction was brutal. On 18 July, David Dacko lays the blame on the opposition parties. The MCLN, but also the Ubangi People's Patriotic Front [FPO] of Dr Abel Goumba--whom Idi Lalla once served in the capacity of spokesman--are banned. Ange Patasse's Movement for the Liberation of Central Africa [MPLC]--which came in second in the March presidential election--was suspended. On 21 July, a state of siege was established over the entire country. On 22 July, finally, after the discovery of some uncapped explosives at Bouar (in the western part of the country), where 800 French soldiers are garrisoned, the army was called in. With a concrete warning: "The use of force includes the use of weapons."

Two months after the banning of the lone labor confederation, which was threatening a strike, the other shoe has dropped. The democratic veneer conferred on the regime by a constitution, a presidential election, and the recognition of the opposition, is brutally shattered. Why this folly? "Only one explanation: Francois Mitterrand's victory," says one French expert. In Bangui, on the night of 10 May, they were dancing in the streets. But not at the presidential palace. Would not the coming to power of the left result in an end to the massive aid Paris was giving to the Dacko regime? And, of course, the first measures taken by the new French authorities

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were not at all reassuring. There was the recall of the (French) secretary general from the presidency of the Central African Republic. And the threats to recall President Dacko's (French) personal guard.

Things went so far, it is said in Bangui, that Dacko reportedly made contact with Moroccan mercenaries. There was, above all, the rather "cool" welcome given in early July to the Central African prime minister in Paris. He was not received by Francois Mitterrand--which is understandable--nor by his counterpart, Pierre Mauroy--which is somewhat more surprising. Simon Narcisse Bozanga found in Jean-Pierre Cot, the minister for cooperation, an unyielding interlocutor. On the particulars: yes to the continuation of French aid (Fr 450 million per year), but on condition that it no longer be used exclusively for making up budgetary deficits, particularly for the wages of the 23,000 civil service employees. This threat was all the more serious because Central African authorities are confronted with a catastrophic economic situation: public debt amounting to nearly Fr 1.5 billion (twice the size of the budget), foundering agricultural production (coffee, cotton), which has been hit by the poor prices paid to the peasants and deterioration in the marketing system, imports which--because the country is landlocked--are costing more and more.

David Dacko, however, still has a major strength: the lack of credibility of the declared candidates to succeed him. Ange Patasse, of course, received close to 40 percent of the votes in the March presidential election. But his lengthy collaboration with the Bokassa regime (he was a minister 11 times) destroys a large part of his appeal. It is the same with Henri Maidou, the former prime minister for the fallen emperor, whose denials in the affair of the massacred schoolchildren earned him the nickname of "Mr Denial" in Bangui. As for Francois Pehoua, he is torn between the business affairs which sustain him and his resolve not to cut off his base of support, which led him squarely to accuse the French soldiers of complicity in the 14 July attack.

There remains Abel Goumba, 56, a tenured professor of medicine. On the plus side: his integrity acknowledged by all, his competence--20 years ago he was the minister of economy and finance for the Central African government, before being thrown into prison by...David Dacko, and sentenced to exile--and above all, his constant opposition to the Bokassa regime. But, on the negative side, that 20-year exile was itself largely responsible for his defeat in the presidential election: 1.42 percent of the votes. From Paris, where he can count on the active support of the PS, Abel Goumba is trying to bring together all of the opposition around a moderate program: continued presence of the French troops, a plan of economic recovery. A project that will take much time and labor...So much that a high French official, disillusioned, concludes: "It is difficult, in the present state of affairs, to let Dacko fall. For without him the CAR [Central African Republic] would be Uganda. Or Chad."

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GENERAL

FRANCE

FRANCO-SOVIET ARCAD-3 MAGNETOSPHERE EXPERIMENTS DISCUSSED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French No 869, 18 JUL 81 pp 53-54

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] The Soviet Arcad-3 satellite, which is to be launched on or after 20 August, by the USSR, is, up to now, the most ambitious production of Franco-Soviet cooperation. This satellite, constructed and operated jointly by CNES [National Center for Space Studies] and INTERCOSMOS, is intended for the Franco-Soviet ARCAD [Arctic Auroral Density] program for studying the physical phenomena of the polar magnetosphere at high latitude (60°) and especially the relationships between the atmosphere and the magnetosphere.

The Arcad-3 program, officially decided on in October 1974 at Kiev (USSR), was established in Marseilles (France). It is a continuation of the French Arcad-1 and 2 experiments onboard Soviet Aureole-1 and 2 satellites, launched on 27 December 1971 and 26 December 1973, respectively, by the USSR. Arcad-3 was to be launched originally in mid-1979, within the framework of the International Magnetosphere Study (IMS), which took place from 1976 to 1979 with the launching of several satellites (GEOS-1 and 2, ISEE-1, 2 and 3), rocket probes (Subtorm, Ipocamp-3, Porcupine programs) and stratospheric balloons (Sambo-2 program).

Arcad-3 is the first satellite actually produced jointly by the USSR and France, which devoted 26 million francs to the operation.

It is a satellite in the "Soviet universal automatic stations" (AUOS) series developed in two versions depending on the missions: the AUOS-T oriented toward the earth and the AUOS-S oriented toward the sun.

The AUOS-T satellite in the Arcad-3 program is a satellite stabilized on the three axes by gravity gradient and magnetic anchoring, with two inertia wheels in addition. It weighs close to 1 ton, including 150 kilograms of scientific payload, consisting for the most part (around 100 kilograms) of French equipment. This equipment includes the scientific experiments, as well as important service equipment: an infrared horizon sensor (SODERN) for altitude control, a CN2B onboard computer (Crouzet) for controlling the satellite and a 136-megahertz telemetering system (EEE) for direct transmission of data from the French experiments to France. It is the first time that a Soviet satellite carries that kind of French equipment.

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Arcad-3 is to conduct about 10 scientific experiments determined by three French laboratories--the Center for Study of Radiation in Space (CESR) in Toulouse, the Environment Physical Research Center (CRPE) in Orleans and the External Geophysics Laboratory (LGE) in Saint-Maur--in addition to two Soviet laboratories: the Research Institute (IKI) in Moscow and the Magnetism and Atmosphere Institute (IZMIRAN) in Moscow.

Certain experiments are devoted to a study of charged particles (Spectro of CESR, FON, Kukuchka and Pietschanka of the IKI) and in particular of electrons (isoprobe of the CRPE), ions and thermal plasma (Dyction of LGE). Others concern a study of the magnetic and electrical fields of very low frequencies (TBF of CRPE, LGE and IZMIRAN) and fluctuations of the magnetic field (TRAC of LGE and IKI), as well as a photometric analysis of the aurora borealis (ALTAIR of the IKI).


This is the first time that the payload of a Soviet satellite has been assembled jointly and the integration of the complete satellite has been conducted jointly by French and Soviet specialists, in France and in the USSR.

The Soviet satellite underwent space environment and electromagnetic compatibility tests in 1979 and 1980 in the facilities of SOPEMEA in the Toulouse space center. The acceptance tests of the satellite were conducted primarily at Toulouse and Moscow. Finally, the whole payload underwent detailed tests, in May 1981, in the IKI before being incorporated in the satellite by the Kapustin-Yar space-launching site near Volgograd by French and Soviet specialists. Next, Arcad-3 was sent to the top secret north launching field, located near Plesetsk, at about 200 kilometers from Arkhangelsk, where the launching will take place, because Arcad-3 is to be placed in a 400-2,000-kilometer circular solar orbit, inclined 82.5° with a period of 109 minutes. Then, the French teams will return to Moscow where they will receive magnetic tape recordings of the latest tests conducted at Plesetsk where the French are not admitted.


The satellite's life is nominally 6 months, including 1 month for acceptance and 5 months for operation, which will be conducted jointly by France and the USSR for the first time. The remote-control programs will be prepared both in France on a Cyber 170-750 computer (CDC) and in the USSR on a French Solar 1604 computer (CIMSA) and on a Soviet computer. Telemetry signal reception will also be handled jointly by a network of eight stations distributed around the world. On this occasion, the CNES is using the Toulouse (France) and the Kourou (French Guiana) stations, in addition to two stations in the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF) in Adelie Land (Antarctica) and on the Kerguelen Islands (Indian Ocean), and a station of the Norwegian Scientific and Industrial Research Council (NTNF) at Tromsø. The USSR is furnishing three stations, respectively at Moscow (IZMIRAN), Apatity (Kola Peninsula) and Norilsk and the foot of the Pontorana Mountains (central Siberia). An agreement was also concluded between CNES and INTERCOSMOS, in March 1979, to handle jointly operational processing of the scientific data at Toulouse (CNES) and at Moscow (IKI and IZMIRAN).

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


"Arcad 3" satellite being tested  
in the CNES simulator in  
Toulouse.



French telemetering unit (with  
antenna) of the "Arcad 3"  
satellite.

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Orbital configuration of the "Arcad 3" satellite  
and layout of French test equipment.

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